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Sunday, September 18, 2011

Math Teacher’s Classroom Banners Don’t Add Up

Sunday, September 18, 2011 - 0 Comments



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Bradley Johnson, a high school calculus teacher and faculty sponsor of the Westview High School Christian Club sued the Poway Unified School District alleging it violated his right to free speech by requiring him to remove banners emphasizing God from his classroom. The banners, which measured seven feet wide by two feet high, stated in large block type “IN GOD WE TRUST,” “ONE NATION UNDER GOD,” “GOD BLESS AMERICA,” “GOD SHED HIS GRACE ON THEE,” and “All men are created equal, they are endowed by their CREATOR.” While Johnson viewed the banners as his way of “celebrating religious heritage in America,” Westview High School Principal Dawn Kastner and other teachers saw the banners as promoting a religious viewpoint that could potentially make students who didn’t share that same viewpoint feel uncomfortable. Kastner suggested that the passages contained on the banners be displayed within their historical context, such as displaying the complete Declaration of Independence or the full Pledge of Allegiance. She also suggested Johnson reduce the size of the banners, but the teacher refused telling Kastner that he had displayed the banners since 1982 and that he considered it his “right to have them up.” Johnson removed the banners and shortly thereafter filed a lawsuit against the school district in federal district court, claiming his first and fourteenth amendment rights were being violated.

Johnson argued that other teachers in the school district were allowed to hang various posters and displays that, in his opinion, were religious in nature, such as Tibetan prayer flags, a Dalai Lama poster, and a Mahatma Gandhi poster. The court ruled in Johnson’s favor finding the school district had impermissibly limited Johnson’s speech and ordered the District not to interfere Johnson’s future display.

The school board appealed the decision, and on September 13, 2011, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling. The appeals court said that unlike Johnson’s banners, which offered a clear religious message, the Dalai Lama poster, Tibetan prayer flags, and other classroom posters did not endorse any religious beliefs. According to Appeals court Judge Richard Tallman, “One would need to be remarkably unperceptive to see the [posted] statements… as organized and displayed by Johnson and not understand them to convey a religious message.” The court’s ruling also hinged on its finding that as a high school calculus teacher Johnson speaks “not as an individual, but as a public employee.” “The Constitution,” it said, “does not permit him to speak as freely at work in his role as a teacher about his views on God, our Nation’s history or God’s role in our Nation’s history as he might on a sidewalk, in a park, at his dinner table or in countless other locations.”

Johnson plans to appeal the ruling, saying he will take his case all the way to the Supreme Court, no matter the cost.

Law and Religion come into constant conflict over the question of what can and cannot be displayed in public school classrooms. I agree with the Appellate court ruling against Bradley Johnson. While his banners portray common phrases that most, if not all of his students would recognize, the size and overall message of these banners conflict with what should be a secular classroom. Certainly they have no connection to the subject of calculus or other mathematic classes. Clearly the fact that Johnson is the sponsor of the Christian club shows that Johnson has strong ties to Christianity and that the true intent of displaying the banners in his classroom was to emphasize and impose his beliefs on all students who matriculated through his classroom. The fact he refused Kastner’s alternative options belies his ulterior motive for hanging the banners. The options offered to him – hanging a poster of the complete Pledge of Allegiance or hanging smaller posters was a fair and equitable response to the situation. The fact Johnson chose to remove the banners completely and take the matter to court proves the banners were of particular religious importance to Johnson and were not a way to celebrate American heritage, like he originally stated. As the 9th Circuit so aptly pointed out, as a teacher, Johnson is not speaking as an individual but as a public employee. He is expected to be a voice of neutrality within his classroom and therefore should focus more on displaying posters of mathematical equations, leaving his religious views to the confines of the Christian club, not his calculus classroom.

Star of David outside Town Hall?

Should a religious ceremony be permitted to take place on township property? On September 8, Connecticut politician Lee Whitnum (D) filed a lawsuit in Bridgeport federal court against the town of Greenwich, CT for allowing a Bar Mitzvah, scheduled to coincide with Israeli Independence Day, to take place in Town Hall. Local politician Peter Tesei is also named as a defendant in the case. The lawsuit charges that the ceremony and the flying of the Israeli flag featuring a Star of David outside the town hall violated the Establishment Clause.


In response, Tesei defended the township by asserting that the flags of many other countries, such as France, Italy, and Sweden, are flown on culturally significant days. He argues that the display of the Israeli national flag was no different than any of these. He also points out that the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) Federation paid the custodial fees required to clean up during and after the event. The Executive Director of the UDA Federation of Greenwich, Pamela Ehrenkranz, argued that Israeli Independence Day is not a religious event, and that the Bar Mitzvah held that day did not feature some religious prayers and blessings that would ordinarily be said. However, Whitnum disagrees, as Israel describes itself as a Jewish State.


The group than ran this event essentially rented the facilities, as they paid the custodial fees. And Tesei does make a good point that other cultural events are held at the hall without issue. If the party had merely been a celebration of Israeli independence, then I don’t think there is any problem with the Establishment Clause, even though the Israeli flag being flown for the day features a Star of David. However, because the Bar Mitzvah was held as well, I think that makes this a religious event even if certain prayers were omitted. I’m not Jewish so I don’t know if this is an apples-to-apples comparison, but I have a hard time imagining a secularized baptism. If my analogy holds, then a Bar Mitzvah couldn’t be secularized either – by its nature it is a religious event.


That being said, whether or not this event violated the Establishment Clause depends on whether or not other religious groups are allowed to hold events at the town hall in my opinion. I agree with Rob Boston, spokesman for Americans United for Separation of Church and State, who was quoted later in the article. He essentially said that either everyone has access to state facilities or no one has access – the township cannot allow one religious group to rent facilities but deny access to another. As long as the township doesn’t favor one religion over another for using its space, I don’t believe this is establishment.


The event held at town hall was religious; I have no doubts about that. But as long as the township isn’t playing favorites as to which groups can hold ceremonies at town hall, I don’t think there is a problem. If the township has space and the religious groups are willing to pay to use it, why shouldn’t they be allowed?

Independence Day or Establishment

A candidate for the 2012 Senate primaries in Connecticut filed suit against the Bridgeport federal court claiming that the town violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment when it allowed a Bar Mitzvah to be held on its property. The Bar Mitzvah, a coming of age ceremony for a Jewish boy, coincided with the celebration of Israeli Independence Day put on by the UJA Federation of Greenwich. The lawsuit also raises questions about the legality of displaying the Israeli flag. The flag, pictured below, features a Star of David, a Jewish religious symbol.

First Selectman Peter Tesei, a defendant in this case, argues, "At the request of Greenwich residents, the town of Greenwich annually recognizes various nationalities and ethnic groups and celebrates their heritage," Tesei said. Furthermore, the town acted no differently than it would on say St. Patrick’s Day when it raises an Irish flag. In addition Pamela Ehrenkranz, Executive Director of the UJA Federation of Greenwich, states the events of the day were secular and thus should be permitted as all other national or ethnic celebrations. Ehrenkranz stated, "I believe that other groups celebrate other national independence days. The celebration of Israeli Independence Day is not a religious event. It was by no means connected to a religious holiday or observance."

The case argues that by allowing a religious ceremony to take place on town property it is endorsing one religion over another. Holding the Bar Mitzvah in the town hall does, in my opinion, breach the no establishment clause of the First Amendment. There should be no religious ceremonies being held on this government property. Rob Boston, stresses in the article that, “it’s all about consistency.” Although she stated that this Bar Mitzvah was a nontraditional one, it is still implicit in the ceremony that there be Jewish prayers read, otherwise it would not be considered a Bar Mitzvah. I agree that prayer events should not be held at government property, regardless of if they are in conjunction with other events. An individual may have been going to the town hall to participate in the political activities and been met with a Rabbi performing a religious ceremony with religious texts.

This idea of consistency must be included in the other aspect of this case. The town annually recognizes other nationalities and ethnicities with flag raising ceremonies. Israel is a nationally recognized state regardless of the religious practices of those within the territory. There are many who support Israel who are not Jewish and the celebration of Israel as a country does not imply the endorsement of one religion.

Law and religion intersect here in a unique way. The political affiliations between the United States and Israel have long created controversy and angered many people who believe this to be an endorsement of the Jewish faith. The religion practiced in the state of Israel should have no bearing on whether they should be able to represent their support in the form of a flag. Although many residents do not view Israel’s independence as a reason for celebration, their disagreement does not make the event unconstitutional. The same could be said of those who object to other flag raising ceremonies for political reasons. It is note-able that no one would be taken seriously if they objected to an Italian heritage celebration on Columbus Day. In addition, the UJA Federation paid a fee of $351.83 for the use of the space and custodian cleaning. The celebration followed all of the requirements that other groups must obey. It seems that objection to the raising of the Israeli flag comes not wholly from political disagreement but from a religious bias.

I disagree with the idea of precedence raised with the display of the Ten Commandments on public property. I argue that although the Star of David is a religious symbol, the flag of the country of Israel is a political object and not a religious one. In this context it is not endorsing Judaism and is celebrating a country, not a faith.

Can the First Amendment Protect Discrimination?


The government of Illinois has recently decided to enact a law that legalizes civil unions.  This law will present same sex couples with many of the legal rights that married couples enjoy.  Though the Illinois government has decided to accept civil unions, there are still many people who continue to discriminate against homosexuality in the state. 

Todd and Mark Wathen, a homosexual couple from Illinois, desired to have their civil union ceremony at a Bed and Breakfast in central Illinois.  After being rejected by the Beall Mansion Bead and Breakfast, they decided to ask another establishment, Timber Creak, to hold their ceremony.  Timber Creak responded to their request by saying that they will never hold a same-sex civil union because they believe, “homosexuality is wrong and unnatural based on what the Bible says about it.”  After receiving this refusal, the couple has decided to sue both establishments for violating their civil rights.  The business owners think that it is within their rights protected by the First Amendment, the freedom to practice religion, to discriminate based on their beliefs, but when religious freedom conflicts with the civil rights of others, one of these freedoms must suffer.

This suit will focus on the extent that the Free Exercise Clause allows for the violation of the civil rights of others.  The shop owners believe that since their religion teaches that homosexuality is wrong, they have the right to deny civil unions to same-sex couples.  Though the owners may have religious reasons to not allow civil unions on their property, they are clearly violating the rights of homosexuals.  They are trying to legitimize their discrimination based off of their religious beliefs, but allowing religion to protect discrimination is a dangerous arena that could lead to some ugly situations.  The civil rights of homosexuals must be protected, even if it means limiting others’ freedom to practice religion.

In the case Cantwell v. Connecticut, an important distinction was made between the freedom to believe, and the freedom to practice religion. Justice Roberts wrote that the freedom to believe is an “absolute” freedom that the government cannot limit, but the freedom to practice, “in the nature of things…cannot be” absolute.  Many cases have reaffirmed that in certain situations the government may limit peoples rights to exercise their religion.  The major question now becomes, when can a government interfere with the free practice of religion.

In the case West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the justices focus on how far the freedom to exercise religion, protects religious actions.  An important part of this case is how the court decides if an action is protected or not.  The court must look to see if the action infringes on the “rights asserted by any other individual.”   By denying same-sex civil unions, the actions of the owners are limiting the civil rights of homosexuals protected by the 14th amendment.  Since the rights of others are being violated by these actions, the court has the right to limit the owner’s freedom to practice their religion.

Though forcing the owners of the Bed and Breakfast establishments to hold civil unions would be violating their freedom to exercise religion, when actions conflict with the rights of others they cannot be allowed.  There is a thin line that determines when a religious action can or cannot be limited by the state, but discrimination certainly should be prevented at all costs.  We cannot allow discrimination to be practiced, and if protecting against it means limiting others’ freedom to practice religion, then freedom of religion must suffer.

If discrimination based off of sexuality can be protected, then what’s to stop discrimination due to race, ethnicity, or even... religion?  Protecting the owner’s actions under the 1st amendment would technically legalize discrimination.  If this discrimination was practiced against people due to their religion, well that would just be protecting one persons' right to practice, which in turn, would limit another's.  The courts must side against the owner’s freedom to practice religion in this case, but by doing so they will be protecting the civil rights of many others.

Thursday, September 15, 2011

Fine for Buggy Safety?

Thursday, September 15, 2011 - 0 Comments

Earlier this week, nine Amish men from Kentucky were sent to jail for not paying traffic fines and court costs. This dispute originated when the men in question were driving buggies on public roads without displaying reflective orange triangles on the back of their vehicles. Displaying these triangular warning signs goes against Amish religious practices and their principles of being "plain people." Many Amish sects believe that wearing bright, eye-catching colors is a display of pride which is viewed as inappropriate under their religious beliefs. Based on these principles, the arrested men do not use orange reflective signs on their buggies. They were willing to use grey reflective tape or lanterns but refused to display the orange signs and have been imprisoned for up to ten days.

The main issue in this dispute concerns the free exercise rights of the Amish individuals. Their desire to refrain from displaying bright colors is a devoutly held religious belief which is accepted as sincere. From the perspective of members of strict Amish sects, the forced display of an orange reflective triangle violates their first amendment right to free exercise of religion. The primary argument of the state officials is that by not displaying bright orange reflectors, the Amish are putting themselves as well as civilians in automobiles in danger. For this reason, the officials feel there is a compelling state interest in forcing Amish buggies to display orange reflective signs. Establishment is not an issue in this case since the traffic law being discussed was created with entirely secular purposes with no intention of affecting any particular religious group.

The officials claim that the forced display of bright, reflective symbols constitutes a compelling state interest. As discussed in Reynolds v. US (1879), many actions can be restricted in order to protect the compelling state interests of peace and order within our society. Traffic laws require all slow moving vehicles to prominently display bright orange reflective triangles on the rear of their vehicles. By having a specific symbol denoting potential dangers on the road, state officials attempt to alert all motorists immediately to potential hazards. Since Amish buggies are considered "slow moving vehicles," they should be required to display orange triangular signs for the safety of all those on public roads. If a different symbol such as grey stripes were used, other motorists may not recognize the hazard as quickly, potentially resulting in additional accidents.

The precedent from Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) would not mandate judgment in favor of the Amish in this instance. This ruling dictates that a regulation cannot target one specific religious group, similar to the way the Mormons were targeted by the anti-polygamy laws of Reynolds v. US (1879). Since the traffic law being discussed is a statewide law and was not intended to have any religious focus, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) does not apply here. The traffic law has the entirely secular purpose of protecting the safety of all motorists regardless of religious beliefs.

While it is important that as few regulations as possible which restrict the free exercise of religion are enforced, in this instance the safety of the public must come first. By driving buggies on public roads which are used primarily by motorists in automobiles going much faster than buggies, the Amish are creating a potential hazard for both themselves as well as other motorists. The requirement that they display a symbol which quickly warns other drivers of the potential danger is not overbroad in scope and is enforced to protect the safety of the populace. If certain groups of Amish individuals do not want to abide by these laws, laws which protect their own lives as much as those of other drivers, then they should not be driving buggies on public roads with speed limits greater than those capable of a one horsepower buggy. The state law does not force all Amish to display a symbol which contradicts their religious beliefs, but rather the law requires cooperation by those driving on state-maintained roads who may pose a danger to the safety of our citizens. If these individuals wish to drive buggies on public roads, then they must abide by traffic safety laws in order to protect the safety of all those on such roads, be they driving a car, truck, or buggy.

Monday, September 12, 2011

Rights and Religion Clash in Court

Monday, September 12, 2011 - 0 Comments


In San Francisco, the Hastings College of Law, which is part of University of California, allows over sixty recognized groups to use meeting space, bulletin boards and whatever else they please to do, as long as they follow one rule: religious discrimination is not permitted. Unfortunately, the Christian Legal Society group thought that they were exempt from this rule. The Christian Legal Society decided that nonbelievers and homosexuals are allowed to be a part of their club, however, they cannot become voting members or assume leadership positions. In addition, the Christian Legal Society’s discrimination was not only geared towards homosexuals, it was also aimed towards heterosexual men and woman who participated in sexual activity before marriage. After not being pleased with the outcome of the California court’s decision to rule against the group, the Supreme Court decided to pick up the group’s case and rule out whether or not this religious group’s standards for members is constitutional.

Hastings College shortly withdrew their recognition from the Christian group. In addition, the law school made it clear to the public that their school promotes an open membership to all student groups and all groups must accept all group members as voting members, no matter their belief. Since Hastings is a public institution it is a moral obligation to promote anti-discrimination. According to the first amendment, all institutions should require a religious freedom atmosphere, whether the school is private or public. Public schools are often known to be more diverse and more accepting to different beliefs or cultures, however, if this court case took place at a private law school the same issue would still be raised. There is no private versus public school vendetta when it comes down to religious discrimination, it would still be frowned upon by the majority at any school.

In this new era most court cases involving religious freedom are usually associated with homosexuality, which applies to a lot of people, especially in San Francisco, the unofficial gay capital of The United States. This is why I found this case to be even more interesting, it occurs in a city where almost everyone accepts homosexuality as a part of their life; if they are not gay, they probably know one or more people that are. The people in the Christianity group should realize that given the location of where they are attending school, more people are likely to be homosexual and should be accepting rather than expelling.

In addition to the Homosexuals who experienced discrimination, all people who have participated in sexual activity prior to marriage aren’t allowed to vote in the Christian group either. I have seen many discrepancies regarding sexual orientation discrimination but this is the first time I have seen discrimination involving sex prior to marriage. This is a surprise to me because college is usually known for its, lack of better terms, sex, drugs, and alcohol. Although people are supposed to go to school for education, one night stands and hookups is what college is usually associated with, especially based on movies and television shows. Law school comes after four years of college, and my guess is that unless students are very religious, most people did not wait for marriage to engage in sexual activity. Furthermore, I would assume by the time most people attend law school they would not be able to vote in the Christian group at Hastings according to their standards.

Sunday, September 11, 2011

Air-Conditioning Takes Priority over Secularity?

Sunday, September 11, 2011 - 0 Comments

Many American households display a similar iconic photo in a widely visible spot in their home: a framed picture of their high school graduate walking across the stage in cap and gown, accepting their diploma. But for graduates of Brookfield Central and Brookfield East Public High Schools in southern Wisconsin, this proudly displayed memory contains another focal point: a 20-foot tall cross above the stage.

Brookfield’s graduation had traditionally been held in the school’s gymnasium, which was much too small and too hot for the graduating class, their families, and their guests to sit comfortably during the ceremony. In 2000, the students requested to hold the ceremony in a nearby nondenominational evangelical Christian church because the venue was much larger and more comfortable than any space the school could provide. The senior class approved the venue change by a majority vote, and the superintendant, who happened to be a member of this church, agreed to hold the graduation in the church’s huge theater, on the grounds that the church provided more space, amenities, and convenience than the school’s gym, and allowed students to invite more guests than they would have if the ceremony was held at other local, secular venues.

Students and families from the school and Americans for Separation of Church and State filed a lawsuit arguing that holding graduation ceremonies in a place of worship violates the Constitution and makes some attendees feel uncomfortable, and requested a court order to force the schools to find an alternate, secular venue. This week, a three-judge panel of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that as long as the graduation ceremony didn’t hold religious elements, there was no government endorsement of religion, and therefore no violation of the Religion Clause.

Walking across the stage at high school graduation to accept a diploma is considered a rite of passage in American schools, and forcing public school students in a multi-cultural and multi-religious town to choose between asking their families to sit in a mega-church to watch them accept their diploma under a giant cross or skip this momentous occasion all together is not Constitutional. The 7th Circuit Court found that as long as the ceremony did not contain religious messages or religious pressures, no endorsement of religion was taking place. Essentially, they found that as long as religious paraphernalia was only visible and present but not explicitly mentioned, there was no problem.

But, with this ruling, there is a huge problem. This church, although large, air-conditioned, and “convenient”, is a widely accepted and extremely visibly a place of worship. Pews contained Bibles, prayers, and hymnals, and a giant cross above the stage. One student claimed that the ceremony, which did not mention any denomination or the church itself, was completely secular, and therefore an appropriate venue. But since when are courts okay with the presence of religious paraphernalia or venues for supposedly secular settings as long as they aren’t “explicitly mentioned”? Would it be okay for a schoolteacher to hold class in a room of a nearby church simply because the church’s multipurpose room, while decorated with Bible verses, was larger than the school’s? What if a Judge held Court in the Synagogue down the street because the Court was overscheduled and overcrowded? According to this Court’s reasoning all of these situations could be acceptable because no religious messages are explicitly stated or endorsed—the groups are simply using the venue out of “convenience”, with no religious intent. The consequences of allowing a public high school to hold a secular graduation in a church for convenience reasons are somewhat limited in scope, but the consequences of allowing this "convenience" excuse for violating the Religion Clause to become precedent has dangerous implications because oftentimes, secularity does require extra effort, and these standards should be upheld for future cases where a lot more is sacrificed in the name of convenience.

Verbal messages and readings, while important, are not everything—no one can claim that simply omitting religious speech makes holding a ceremony in a church non-religious. Sitting in an empty church in silence, even while no one else is present, is still a religious activity because churches are still an obvious place of worship, regardless of what the venue is being used for. What if you were planning your Muslim wedding and the Imam tried to convince you that it would make more sense to hold your ceremony at the Catholic Church down the street because it’s bigger, and air-conditioned? True, it’s not a Mosque, but don’t worry—they wouldn’t say or read anything Catholic, so no one will notice the venue at all…right?

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