Friday, September 6, 2013
Questioning the Constitutionality of Certain Legislative Prayer
In upcoming weeks, the Supreme Court will decide a significant case concerning issues regarding church and state. The case is called Greece vs. Galloway and it consists of two individuals challenging Greece, a suburb in upstate New York, for opening its city council meetings with prayers from local clergy members. The two individuals are claiming that the opening prayers are an infringement on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution. “Government should be inclusive,” started 51-year-old Susan Galloway, a woman challenging the town of Greece, “there are people who don’t believe, and they’re a part of this country too.” The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Greece’s practice was unconstitutional on the grounds that the prayers had been overwhelmingly Christian. However, the Supreme Court will take on this case to possibly overturn that ruling.
The town of Greece began their tradition of inviting clergy to speak in the year 1999. Up until 2007, all of the speakers reciting prayers were Christian. The speaker’s message tended to use explicitly Christian language, with frequent references to Jesus Christ. After many citizens were unhappy with the lack of religious diversity, the town of Greece decided to open up their prayers. Wiccans, Jews, and the leaders of the Bah’ai faith delivered prayers over the next two years, but then in 2009 all the speakers were solely from the Christian clergy once again. The plaintiffs were angry that the town arranged to have these prayers, chose the speakers, and required everyone to sit through the prayers to hear the rest of the legislative session.
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| President Dieter F. Uchtdorf says the prayer at the 2009 Utah Legislature's first session |
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| President Obama and the First Lady Pray |
This case raises the debate whether it is constitutional to have prayer with legislative duties, and if it matters what type of prayer is being practiced. If this case is decided in favor of Greece, the Establishment Clause will therefore embrace the idea of legislative prayer even if it is seen to “favor” one religion specifically. If the court decides in favor of Galloway, the Establishment Clause will still respect legislative prayer, but mandate it to be neutral. That is where it begins to be a slippery slope. What determines prayers as neutral? Who gets to say the prayers? What can they say? The court will have to define a harsh line on what is neutral—a task that may be impossible.
I would agree with the town of Greece, in saying that this specific legislative prayer is constitutional, regardless of any favoring or leaning. In 1983 the Supreme Court decided on a similar case called Marsh vs. Chambers. In this case there was a First Amendment challenge to a permanent minister opening legislative sessions with prayer in Nebraska. Up to this point, the court had interpreted the Establishment Clause to prohibit the government from favoring a religion, or establishing one, for decades; therefore the plaintiffs seemed to have rational reasoning behind their case. However, the court ruled 6-3 in favor of Nebraska, upholding the practice of legislative prayer. The court did, however, make an important exemption stating that there must be religious neutrality in the legislative prayer. Part of the opinion stated that these prayers couldn’t be “exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.” So although Marsh vs. Chambers created a limit on legislative prayer, the court never made a clear distinction on where the line should be drawn.
Therefore, I believe that the plaintiff will have a difficult time making their case, considering the precedent for this case and historical respect our country has for legislative prayer. The question becomes, where is the line drawn? If our government claims neutrality, what about in the Pledge of Allegiance where we all recite “under god?” That phrase including “god” doesn’t seem neutral, especially when some consider themselves to be extremely patriotic and atheist. Therefore I think this case raises another important issue: the courts still aren’t sure whether they can truly endorse religion in general, or whether they must remain strictly neutral—a task that has been proved to be challenging on multiple accounts.
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