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Sunday, November 3, 2013
Sunday, November 3, 2013
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This is a question that the Supreme Court of India is currently wrestling with when deciding whether schools can teach yoga.
This is also a question that has been raised in the past few years in the United States, most recently in July in California. In the Encinitas Union County School District, children are required to attend 2-30 minute sessions of yoga per week. Should the students wish not to participate in yoga, they do have alternatives that would fulfill the health and wellness school requirement instead. On top of this, yoga poses now have basic kid-friendly names like peacock pose or crisscross applesauce pose. Even with the offered alternative and the renamed poses, parents of two-children in the district decided that teaching yoga has a religious component and thus has no place in schools. They thus proceeded to sue the school district.
The parents’ attorney, Dean Broyles, apparently argued in court that yoga is inherently religious and thus teaching it in public schools violates the constitutional separation of church and state. While it is important to remember that “the separation of church and state” is not explicitly in the constitution, the argument that teaching yoga in schools helps to establish religion can be made.
In American culture today, one might laugh at the idea that yoga is a religious practice. Yoga classes are taught in most gyms and there are studios all over the country, teaching a variety of forms of yoga from vinyasa to bikram. In the past decade, the fitness world has even seen the creation of yoga hybrid classes, where yoga is combined with other exercise disciplines like kickboxing and pilates. The American College of Sports Medicine and many doctors even stand behind yoga as a form of exercise. Studies have found that yoga can lower stress and blood pressure, improve balance and flexibility, and provide an array of other health benefits. Most American people would agree that they view yoga as a form of exercise, one that around 20 million Americans practice.
But yoga still has religious affiliations. Yoga is practiced as a part of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Yoga appears in all three of these major world religions’ religious texts/associated works. The Hindu American Foundation even claims that yoga and Hindu philosophy cannot be separated and that yoga is "a Hindu way of life." Religious practice aside, few deny that there is a spiritual component to yoga, the word itself meaning basically “to unite” or “to join together,” and this component is definitely entwined with philosophical and theological thought of Asian religious traditions.
A prominent Southern Baptist Minister, Albert Mohler, particularly views yoga as a religious practice and even wrote an article in which he explained how yoga contradicts the Christian religion. In the article, Mohler says that, “when Christians practice yoga, they must either deny the reality of what yoga represents or fail to see the contradictions between their Christian commitment and their embrace of yoga.” The contradictions apparently rest in the spiritual goals of many poses. So are many Christians simply denying the reality of what yoga represents?
Going on the American Yoga Association website also yields very interesting results for the religious nature of yoga. The general information page claims that yoga does not have a creed and thus it is not a religion, but in the preceding paragraphs talks about how the first step of classical yoga, yama, entails refraining from violence, casual sex, hoarding etc. While obviously no one practices yoga as a religion, such beliefs could easily reflect a religious creed. Besides this, relevant to this case in particular is the author of this posts’ claim that yoga should not be practiced by children under 16.
Despite all the information that points to a definitive link between yoga and religion, I believe that because yoga is primarily strictly an exercise in America that it can be taught in public schools. I do agree that the alternatives and changes that the school district offered/made are necessary to protect the constitutionality of the yoga requirement, however. Should an alternative to yoga not have been made, then I think that an establishment case could have been made (although it still would have been difficult). On a separate note though, I do think that the school district should look into the safety of kids practicing yoga.
So what do you think? Is yoga religious in nature? Should it be taught in public schools? If it is taught, should there be alternatives and alterations made to its practice?
Sunday, October 27, 2013
Sunday, October 27, 2013
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There have been many tricky court cases involving the establishment clause in our nation’s history. Recently in October of this year, a new situation has been brought to light. Records have shown that in the city of Cincinnati, there has been a 51 percent increase in homicides from 2012 to 2013. This is disturbing news for many and as a result, community members will participate in multiple prayer walks involving fourteen different communities in the area. The prayer walks themselves are not the issue at hand, but the fact that the Cincinnati Police Department issued a statement, along with several pastors in the community, inviting all citizens to participate in the prayer walks. In response to this invitation by the Police Department, the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) wrote a letter in which they openly criticize the police department for their support of the initiative. The FFRF used many strong and critical statements in their letter such as the phrase, “Public officials should get off their knees and get to work.”
The issue, which the FFRF states, is the actions of the CPD conflicting with the first amendment and the rights of the citizens. The first amendment prohibits the establishment of a religion and the FFRF holds the view that the establishment of religion is indeed occurring here. In the FFRF’s written letter, Andrew L. Seidel states, “It is a fundamental principle of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence that the government cannot in any way promote, advance, or otherwise endorse religion.” The statement comes from the Supreme Court’s commonly held stance that there must be neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion. According to the FFRF, the CPD’s support of these prayer walks is not only coercive, but offends and excludes citizens who do not believe prayer to be the proper response to this situation. The letter asks that the police department responds to the letter with the changes they are enacting to remedy these constitutional violations.I believe the FFRF makes valid points and seems persuasive in regards to its interpretation of the first amendment. It correctly cited the Supreme Court’s decision in the Epperson v Arkansas case in which a law that forbade the teaching of evolution in a public school was declared unconstitutional. In the majority opinion the court mentioned the fact that the government must remain neutral in regards to religion. Clearly in the case at hand, the government represented by the CPD, has declared its support of a religious cause by involving itself in the invitation. One might even cite the Lemon test, that has been commonly used in establishment cases, stating that this clearly violates the second part of the test forbidding a promotion of religion over non-religion. The FFRF also incorporates alarming statistics regarding religious areas and non-religious areas. Among the statistics, the FFRF states that the least religious areas of the world have the lowest reported homicide and violence rates. Therefore, people should see this declaration of prayer in order to alleviate violence as a ridiculous and unsupported notion. The FFRF seems convincing, along with the majority of establishment cases that have be ruled in concordance with its opinion, however I am not persuaded.
I see this issue as an opportunity to return the original intentions of the founders of this nation. I’m persuaded by the fact that, despite the very Christian undertones written into the constitution, the fathers were concerned with religious freedom for all. I read the first amendment as an invitation to people of all religious convictions and therefore as a constitutionally proscribed positive relationship between the government and religion. Justice Reed makes a compelling argument while dissenting in McCollum v Board of Education. The case concerns an Illinois law allowing religious groups to come into the public school to teach religion for a half hour during the school day. The court ruled this unconstitutional even though students were not coerced into attending these religious classes. Justice Reed states, “The prohibition of enactments respecting the establishment of religion do not bar every friendly gesture between church and state.” In this case, the CPD is merely a “connector” allowing multiple like-minded groups the ability to come together. It is important to note that the CPD, in the two walks that have been held thus far, have not participated as uniformed police offers in the walks. This shows the CPD’s commitment to its governmental separation from religious support. In addition, in more recent cases involving the first amendment the Supreme Court has chosen to focus on the idea expressed in the first part of the Lemon Test, that a secular purpose must be present. Clearly the focus of the CPD’ invitation is the prevention or curtailment of crime. The CPD’s hope is that these prayer walks may bring the community together, encourage peace, and discourage violence. Furthermore, if we must judge sincerity, we may consider the fact that members of the CPD have not even participated in the prayer walks as governmental officers.
While I do think the FFRF makes valid points, and I think that the Supreme Court would indeed side with the FFRF here, that decision seems wrong to me. I agree with Justice Rehnquist in his opinion that the wall of separation must be put aside. We must destroy the hostility that exists between the government and religion. Were the FFRF to win this case before the Supreme Court I think those religious individuals who live in America should be concerned for their religious freedom. What are your opinions?
In the Jewish community, a women does not have the right to divorce their husbands, in order for a divorce to be final, the husband must give permission, called a get. If a husband refuses to give a get, the marriage is still in full effect and the wife becomes an “agunah”—a chained women. A husband must give a get at his own free will, but there have been Jewish law tribunals that encourage these obstinate husbands to give gets. A common decision would be a tribunal who will ban the husband from his synagogue until he does grant and give a get. Under civil law, the wife does have the option and right to get divorced and remarried, but many women refuse to do so because it would undermine them and their children and most likely would become outcasts in their communities.
Earlier this month, two New JerseyRabbis allegedly planned the kidnapping and torturing of reluctant husbands who had refused to grant their wives a legitimate Jewish divorce. The purpose for the Rabbi’s actions was to force these men to consent to their wives’ request for divorce under Jewish law. These two rabbis charged $10,000 for a tribunal ruling that would allow the use of violence against the men and $50,000 to hire people to kidnap and torture the men. These two rabbis were caught due to a federal sting operation. An undercover female FBI agent had reached out to Rabbi Epstein and expressed that she wanted a divorce and had described her husband as a businessman in South America, who had refused to give her a get. Rabbi Epstein urged her to have her husband travel to New Jersey; subsequently, Rabbi Epstein and Rabbi Wolmark organized their own rabbinical court to issue a religious order that would authorize the use of violence to obtain a forced get. Eight of Rabbi Epstein’s associates met at a New Jersey warehouse where they had finalized the kidnapping plan and the FBI agents moved in to arrest the group.
This makes me question whether it is Jewish tradition to conduct this kind of act to obtain a divorce. After some online research, I came across an article in The Jewish DailyForward where it explains what possible resolutions have emerged in rabbinical courts that could be used to obtain a get. Shockingly, a rabbinical court can in fact authorize the use of violent force against a husband. It is unimaginable that a husband would cruelly leave his wife trapped in a nonfunctional marriage and therefore it is believed that the use of force could serve as a medium to free the husband’s inner desire to do the right thing and convince him to grant his wife a get. The use of violence and forced coercion could protect some of the community’s vulnerable members, such as these wives. However many believe that these acts of violence and torture not only violates United States law but also Jewish Law. Any rabbinical court decree that is secured with acts of bribery would be considered invalid; violence visited on a husband pursuant to such a tainted decree would only induce him to grant an invalid divorce. Ultimately, the use of violence involves the extortion of money from people it was meant to protect, and also leads to illegal brutality and attracts questions of religion validity. Do you think this is enough religious evidence to justify the use of violent torture to grant a divorce? Is there any compelling state interest to intervene in this resolution?
This sparked my curiosity even further and I looked into other possible resolutions that have been used in the Jewish community. This particular incentive embraces the use of a contract opposed to coercion. The Beth Din of America, which is one of America’s most prominent rabbinical court took the initiative and drafted a prenuptial agreement that could be used within the Jewish community. This prenuptial agreement would require the husband to provide his wife with a daily support payment of $150 for each day the two no longer live together. Some believe that this agreement is a successful alternative to granting gets because it navigates a variety of legal complexities. The daily payment simply continues the husband’s obligation to support his wife and therefore cannot be seen as financial coercion. The prenuptial agreement does not require the husband to grant a religious divorce but only to make payments if he fails to do so, thereby enabling courts in the United States to enforce the agreement without violating constitutional prohibitions.
In Connecticut, this past January the court enforced this “Jewish prenup” above constitutional objections, noting that the terms of the agreement did not undermine the separation of church and state. In Light v. Light, Rachel Light sued in Connecticut Supreme Court saying that the couple had separated years earlier but that Eban Light had refused to grant her a get. Rachel Light asked the court to enforce the provision in the prenup ordering her husband to pay her a sum for each day he refused to grant the get. Eban Light argued that the prenup is a religious matter and therefore is unconstitutional for a secular court to enforce the contract. Judge Gould found that enforcing the prenup was no different from enforcing a secular contract and cited Odatalla v. Odatalla where a New Jersey court enforced an Islamic mahr agreement that had been signed in Iran. And in Avitzur v. Avitzur, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that it is constitutional for a secular court to enforce a ketubah, or marriage contract, to prevent an agunot. Judge Gould treated this Orthodox prenup in the same routine we would have treated any other secular prenuptial contract.
In this case I would have to agree with Eban Light that this is a religious contract and therefore should not be interfered by a secular court. By the court already deciding on this case, it creates an entanglement because a court is developing and establishing a ruling based on a religious matter. Since the court ruled that Eban Light must pay his wife until he grants the get, the court is validating this religious prenuptial agreement that was created by a religious institution—Beth Din of America, therefore creating a preference to address religious matters not maintaining a separation of church and state and this why I strongly believe that rabbinical courts should address the enforcement of these prenuptial agreements not "secular" state courts.Would you say the same?Do you believe that the use of violent force is justified as a traditional religious practice used in obtaining a get and therefore the state/federal government should not interfere and allow such actions to occur? In your opinion, is it constitutional for a state court to enforce the "Jewish Prenup"? Is there any compelling state interest to intervene with both these resolutions?
JBS is a food processing company located in various areas of the United States. One of its places of operation is in Grand Island, Nebraska. In past years, there has been some contention between the company and its Somali Muslim employees. The Muslim employees believe they should be granted exemptions during the work day to practice their religion, as granted by their rights in the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, but JBS believes this burden on their religion is not as great as the burden the exemptions would have on the company.
In 2007, about 80 to 100 of the Muslim employees protested working at JBS because the company had denied the Muslim employees’ request to use their “informal breaks”, such as bathroom breaks, to pray. Instead, JBS expected them to pray during scheduled breaks. In addition, in 2008, JBS refused to move the scheduled meal break to a time that corresponded with the sunset prayer time in order to accommodate for the observance of Ramadan.
This issue was brought to the court by the EEOC, and the decision was made on October 11, 2013. The court decided in favor of JBS, denying the Muslim employees of the exemptions. Judge Camp had to decide whether the accommodation would generate a larger cost for the employer and other non-Muslim employees, or if it would generate a larger religious burden for the Muslim employees. After reviewing the case, Judge Camp decided that the use of “informal breaks” for prayer and the change in meal time would both result in a greater “undue hardship” for JBS than for the Muslim employees. With respect to prayer during informal breaks, if operation of the production lines were not stopped entirely during the prayer breaks, the remaining workers would have the pressure of working faster and harder, which would be hazardous for them. If the production were slowed down during these prayer breaks, the meat would be contaminated after being exposed to the air for a longer span of time. With respect to the change in meal time, JBS argues that a 30-minute break for all employees would provide a situation where the cattle would remain on the “kill floor” for more than 45 minutes, meaning a decrease in the meat’s value, and ultimately a financial loss for JBS.
The question here is whether this case was decided correctly. Should the Muslim employees have been provided the accommodation for their religious practices during work time? Everyone is entitled to the free exercise of his or her religion, as granted by the First Amendment and the Muslim employees are clearly denied the ability to exercise their religious practices in accordance with their beliefs. Is the “undue hardship” incurred by JBS a great enough concern compared to the burden imposed on the Muslim employees?
This issue is similar to the matter of contention seen in Goldman v. Weinberger (1986), with regards to hindrances on free exercise of one’s religion. In that case, the Supreme Court decided that Goldman would not be allowed the exemption to wear his yarmulke while on duty in the hospital for the Air Force. The Court argued that there was a compelling state interest for uniformity among the members of the Air Force. They believed the burden imposed on this mission as a result of Goldman wearing the yarmulke was greater than the burden imposed on Goldman’s right to free exercise of religion. Since this court ruling, though, the decision has been altered, in which members of the Air Force are now allowed to wear yarmulkes. In light of this understanding, was the decision in EEOC v. JBS USA the correct one, or is the religious burden great enough to garner an accommodation?
Though both Goldman v. Weinberger (1986) and the present case appertain to the issue of free exercise of religion while on the job, I believe there is a difference in how they should be decided. While Goldman should have been allowed the exemption to wear his yarmulke, the Muslim employees still should not be granted the accommodation. Knowing that religious discrimination is a significant issue concerning constitutional rights, the employers at JBS needed sufficient reason and evidence to deny the Muslims’ ability to participate in their religious practices while at work. In that respect, JBS had adequate grounds to impose the religious burden on the Muslim employees. The accommodations would not only be detrimental to the success of the company as a whole, but would also burden the non-Muslim employees that would have to make up for the work missed while the Muslim employees left for prayer. While I do see that the Muslims feel this decision denies them of their constitutional rights, the accommodations for the Muslim employees would have too large a harmful, though unintended, effect on the company and employees that ultimately outweighs the Muslim employees’ rights to practice their religion.
The Sacrament of Reconciliation is a sacrament of the Catholic Church where one anonymously confesses his or her sins to a priest. The confidentiality of these confessions are paramount, and failure of the priest to uphold the confidentiality would result in excommunication of the priest. Fortunately for the Catholic Church, some United States laws have provisions that prevent the government from requiring information from confessions. In thinking about issues of religious establishment, I assure you that concerns of a slippery slope are not necessary, because as you will soon see, we have already slid to the very bottom of the slope.
In 2000, a family with a minor daughter moved from Baton Rouge to Clinton, in Feliciana Parish, where they began attending “Our Lady of the Assumption Catholic Church”. The family soon became well acquainted with a Parishioner named George Charlet Jr., who the daughter viewed as second grandfather from 8 years old through her adolescence. Eventually, Charlet allegedly kissed and fondled their daughter.
Confused, the daughter then decided to seek spiritual guidance through the Sacrament of Reconciliation on three separate occasions. After she relayed to the priest the abuse she suffered at the hands of Charlet, the priest merely responded that the daughter needed to handle the situation herself, or else “too many people would be hurt”. The daughter eventually confessed to her parents, after which they ordered Charlet to cease contact with their daughter. The following Sunday, however, the parents witnessed Charlet “approach their daughter after church and hug her openly against her will”. They then filed a formal complaint against Charlet at the sheriff’s office. On February 9th 2009, during the investigation, Charlet died unexpectedly after suffering a heart attack while in recovery following a knee replacement surgery.
On July 6, 2009, the parents filed a petition for damages suffered by them and their daughter, naming the deceased George J. Charlet, Jr., Charlet Funeral Home, Inc., where Charlet was the president; the priest, whom they alleged was a mandatory reporter who failed to report the abuse; and the church, alleging liability for the priest’s misconduct. In February 2013, the priest and the church filed a motion in limine to exclude all evidence regarding the confessions, including testimony by the child herself.
The defendants argues that the damages that child suggested were due to Charlet, not the priest, and that the priest attained knowledge of the abuse through the Sacrament of Reconciliation, meaning that the communication was confidential. La. Children Code art. 603(15)(c) provides that a priest is not required to report knowledge gained from “confidential communications.” The article states “communication is confidential when relayed to a clergyman when it is made in private and not intended for further disclosure”. The defendants also argue that had the priest violated the confidentiality of the Sacrament of Reconciliation, he would be subject to excommunication. They therefore argued that if the law were to require them to provide information from the Sacrament of Reconciliation, it would impair their freedom to exercise their religion.
The trial court denied the defense’s motion, claiming that the priest could have acquired certain knowledge regarding the abuse outside of the confessional, and that such knowledge should be permissible. In addition, the court claimed that according to the Code of Evidence Art. 511, the privilege to confidentiality belongs to the communicant, the daughter, who in this case waived the privilege. Therefore, the court found that the testimony of the daughter was relevant, and she was entitled to waive the privilege. The Court of Appeals unfortunately reversed the trial court’s decision, claiming that the priest was not a mandatory reporter as the information was acquired during the Sacrament of Reconciliation. In addition, the Court of Appeals granted “No Cause of Action” and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit.
The Court of Appeals’ questionable handling of this case is only a small part of the problem. The larger problem is the severe establishment of religion found within the Children’s Code. The provisions fail two of the criteria of the Lemon test, which is useful in this particular instance for demonstrating establishment. First, there is no secular purpose of allowing priests to withhold information important for bringing child abusers to justice. In addition, it creates excessive entanglement, as it presents an image of the government protecting criminals associated with religious institutions. While the provision’s primary effect isn’t one that advances or hinders religion, it certainly favors religion over non-religion, as it provides religious ministers with the power to withhold information that individuals holding secular jobs, such as physicians or psychologists, do not have. The establishment clause says that neither state nor federal governments can “ pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.” Therefore, the provisions in the Children’s Code are clear violations of the establishment clause.
For argument’s sake, let’s say that the provisions for religious ministers in the Children’s Code are not an establishment of religion. In Sherbet v. Verner (1963), Justice Brennan said that infringing on freedom of religion is justifiable if there is a compelling state interest to do so, and there have been cases where the Supreme Court has decided that infringements upon free exercise were justified by a compelling state interest. For example, in Goldman v Weinberger (1986), the Supreme Court ruled that the compelling state interest of creating a strong military was enough to warrant violating Goldman’s free exercise of religion by not allowing him to wear his yarmulke while on duty at an Air Force base. Therefore even if the provisions were not establishments and even if removing the provisions would hamper the free exercise of religion, there is a compelling state interest to stop child abuse. This compelling state interest is enough to warrant the restriction of religious freedom that removing these provisions would cause.
This situation clearly demonstrates how establishments of religion can become problematic. By providing the Catholic Church with a provision that allows their priests to withhold confidential information from the Sacrament of Reconciliation, in order to protect their freedom of religion, we have slipped so far down the slippery slope the point where the government protected the Catholic Church from taking accountability for its actions, and prevented an abused child from finding justice. In situations like this there is a compelling state interest to restrict religious freedom, as the safety of a child should take precedence over the Catholic Church.
Sunday, October 20, 2013
Sunday, October 20, 2013
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A Sikh college student named Harsimran Singh in California was denied access to an Amtrak bus due to wearing his kirpan, or religious sword, that Sikhs wear as a symbol to protect the weak and promote justice. The Sikh faith requires the “Five Ks” which include Kesh, Kangha, Kara, Kachera, and Kirpan, are five articles worn for the Sikh to show his or her faith. Kesh is uncut hair, which is kept wrapped in a turban. A Kangha is a small wooden comb that is used twice a day to comb clean the hair of tangles. A Kara is an iron bangle that symbolizes life as never ending and a symbol connecting the Sikh to the community by the bangle being a link in the Sikh change. A Kachera is a piece of clothing that is similar to a pair of boxers, or shorts, and symbolizes self-respect and control over lust. Finally, the Kirpan is a short dagger that is supposed to be kept on the person at all times and is not allowed to be used unless in self-defense of one’s self or another.
The Kirpan being held by Harsimran was over his shirt but under his jacket. The bus driver noticed it and told Harsimran that he would need to remove it and put it in his bag, which would have to be put in the luggage compartment in order to ride the bus. The bus driver then called the police, who told Harsimran the same thing causing Harsimran to not ride the bus due to refusing to compromise his religious beliefs. Harsimran tried to show the police the Kesh while trying to explain what it was and was told to keep his hands away from the “weapon.” Harsimran claimed he was very confused by what was happening not because of what was being said but because he had ridden the same bus, along with Amtrak trains, before with no problems. The company claimed that the driver is responsible for the safety of all its passengers and therefore made the correct decision to not allow the “weapon” to be on person while Harsimran was riding.
I do not agree with the driver’s decision, especially if Harsimran explained to him what the Kesh was and the religious importance and rules regarding it. I thought it was extremely insensitive for the driver to disregard what Harsimran said and call the police. I also found the police response unfair due to their lack of listening to Harsimran’s explanation of religious meaning behind the Kesh. On top of the insensitivity shown in this case, it is hard to believe that the bus driver had not heard about the Sikh faith when there have been several attacks on Sikh’s due to the turbans they wear and people being ignorant and mistaking them not only for Muslims but accusing them of being terrorists. I cannot believe that Amtrak would be able to do anything but inform their drivers to be aware that a Sikh passenger may be carrying a Kesh and that this should be permitted due to religious reasons not only behind the Kesh but also how it is handled.
What do you think about how he was treated by both the driver and the police?
"Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you G-d?"
Anyone testifying in a court of law in the United States hears this phrase, or a very similar variation, and agrees to the statement. This is customary in many judiciary systems, as it is important to affirm the validity of the statements which one makes in a court of law. The controversy comes, however, when attempting to define the proper oath, and what to swear on. Britain is currently debating the oath on the Bible before testifying in court. This could set an important precedent for many other countries in the global system, including the United States where such an issue is already extremely controversial.Recently, a Bristol Magistrate, Ian Abrahams, proposed the radical notion of doing away with all religiously affiliated oaths in court. Instead of swearing on any religious book, witnesses and defendants would take a secular pledge that would allow them to better understand the consequences of their testimony. It would also apply to everyone more equitably. The new oath would read something to this effect: "I promise very sincerely to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and I understand that if I fail to do so I will be committing an offense for which I will be punished and may be sent to prison". Groups such as the National Secular Society embrace the change, but others such as the Revd. Arun Arora of the Church of England disagree, believing the change to be political correctness taken too far. While the Ministry of Justice declares that it is not planning on changing the oath anytime soon, the matter is still a contentious issue within current society.
Many previous posts have discussed such intertwining of state and religion, with issues like "in G-d we Trust" on our money, in our Pledge of Allegiance, and as our national motto. This time, the focus is on the Bible being used for oaths such as before testimony in court and even being sworn into the Presidency. Should we be using religious texts for these events when we've been told our Constitution intends for a wall of separation between the church and the state? To be clear, in US courts you have not had to swear on the Bible since the 60s - the issue is whether to ban taking oaths on any religious books whatsoever.
As we grow ever more concerned about religious diversity we begin to see common practices that may have been rooted in religious traditions as establishment of that original religion - the historical/traditional argument. Yes, the United States is overwhelmingly a Christian nation and Presidents have been swearing on the Bible since George Washington himself, but as a modern country we recognize that there are many people of very differing religious faiths as well as those who choose not to worship at all. Not only was the Constitution written to protect minorities, it explicitly prevents an establishment of religion by the state. In the world we live in, we can no longer excuse the practices we engage in to religious tradition or majority.
Some would even argue that people swearing on the Bible could be degrading to Christianity. The practice of taking an oath with the Bible was instituted when most, if not all people, were G-d fearing. This meant that they understood the consequences of the oath they were taking, and knew that if they lied, they were to be judged by their G-d. Today, however, many people do not think twice about the oath they're taking and its relation to G-d's judgement. Because of this, the new proposed oath suggests mentioning that the swearer will be punished with prison for lying to the court. This change would make the oath more realistic, and might convince people to think twice before committing perjury.
And this applies to other religious texts as well. Let's discuss the prospect of swearing on any holy book. Today, people are allowed to take an oath on their preferred religious scripture, but where do we draw the line? As with all church/state discussions, we come to the dreaded 'slippery slope'. Many people argue that the courts cannot judge the sincerity of a religion, so how does the court decide which books are acceptable to swear upon. What if you belong to the Church of Deathly Hallows? Besides, allowing everyone to use their own religious text is great, until it leads to prejudice and discrimination. There is no way to dissuade someone's biases, and if that juror sees the defendant taking an oath on the Qur'an he may be immediately prejudiced.
Additionally, it may be argued that getting rid of religious texts in oath taking situations would be considered favoring atheism, but preferenciating non-religion over religion might not be such a bad idea in this case.
Overall, I believe that we should change the oath, as well as remove religious texts from our courts.
How do you feel? Are you worried about people not truly understanding the consequences of lying in court? Should there be a high and impenetrable wall of separation here, or is banning religious books taking it too far? If so, what regulations would be made to decide which books are acceptable?
