Monday, January 23, 2012
In a recent article in the New York Times, President Obama’s decision regarding exemptions to his healthcare reform legislation has had a serious effect on religious institutions. Under President Obama’s new healthcare reform laws, all employers are to provide employees with preventive health coverage, including various forms of birth control, at no cost to the employee. Church-affiliated organizations are extremely opposed to this piece of legislation. Most feel as though they are forced to endorse a policy which is in direct violation of their moral opinions. Although, exemptions may apply to employers without variations of faith among employees, the exemption is not applicable to multi faith religious institutions such as hospitals and universities. Despite arguments from several religious institutions, President Obama has made his final decision not to broaden the exemption, but to extend the compliance deadline by an additional year for religious institutions.
Although the most apparent issue at hand is the far too familiar battle between Church and State, the ongoing opposition by the Church to science and women’s rights can also be detected by moderate observation. The state makes every attempt not to inhibit institutions of faith, while still providing services to its citizens. This, however, becomes complicated when services being offered by the state are not in compliance with the moral order of its citizens as decided by their faith and the Church. The policies of the state are often allied with modern principles of science and individual’s rights. In modernity lies infringement upon tradition and ancient practices and beliefs held so tightly by the Church.
If the exemption to religious institutions is broadened, those who are in moral agreement with the use of contraception may be deprived the opportunity to receive the same healthcare benefits as those not employed by a religious institution. A nurse at St. Joseph’s Hospital may have fewer healthcare opportunities than a cashier at the local Wal-Mart, despite her moral regard towards contraception. With the exemption maintaining its current limitations and specificity, it allows people with differing religious perspectives from their employers to receive premium quality healthcare. This is a modern piece of legislation conducive to the modern society in which we operate. Our society is one in which individuals are given the opportunity to utilize readily available resources in order to maintain a higher standards of health. We have scientific evidence to prove the effectiveness of better healthcare decisions, and thus we alter our legislation and lifestyles accordingly. Although this inevitably will result in discrepancies between the separation of Church and State, this piece of legislation in no way inhibits faith based traditions, and ultimately places the responsibility of healthcare decisions on the individual.
The Congregation Ahavath Achim, a Conservative Jewish community located in Colchester, CT, has recently become embroiled in a civil lawsuit with one of its own members over the burial of a Christian woman in the interfaith section of one of the Jewish cemeteries it manages. According to a memorandum issued by Judge Robert Martin in 2011, the cemetery in question was originally managed by the Colchester Jewish Aid Congregation, which merged with Congregation Ahavath Achim in 1999. Per the merger agreement, responsibility for the cemetery transferred to Congregation Ahavath Achim with the stipulation that no non-Jew be buried in the Jewish sections of the cemetery. In 2009, Congregation Ahavath Achim elected to construct an interfaith section next to the existing Jewish section.
The plaintiff, Maria Balaban, who was previously a member of the Colchester Jewish Aid Congregation and now a member of Congregation Ahavath Achim and serves as a board member for the cemetery, has filed a motion with the Connecticut Superior Court suing Congregation Ahavath Achim for violating the terms of the merger agreement and disregarding what she says is the intended purpose of the interfaith section: to allow for the burial of non-Jewish spouses and family members and those who have close connections to Congregation Ahavath Achim. Spokespersons for Congregation Ahavath Achim maintain that the interfaith section was created as a resting place for anyone, regardless of religious or congregational affiliation. As part of the suit, Balaban, who owns multiple burial plots in the cemetery and also has many relative interred there, is requesting a temporary injunction for the disinterment and relocation of the body of Juliet Steer, the Christian woman buried in the interfaith section of the cemetery. Since Steer had no ties to the Congregation, Balaban argues that the burial and continued interment of Steer’s body violates the intended purpose of the interfaith section and infringes on her rights as an owner of burial plots in the cemetery.
While this case, at first glance, seems to be a simple matter of whether or not a legally binding merger agreement was upheld, a larger issue is at stake; that of the proper role of government involvement in religiously motivated and informed disputes. For all parties concerned, sincere religious belief and desire to adhere to a particular religious legal code has informed their respective actions throughout the events in question. In ruling on this case, Judge Martin will be called to consider and decide the merits of the competing arguments informed by religious sentiments. Underpinning both the wording of the merger agreement and Balaban’s personal concerns with the internment of Steer’s body in the cemetery is the recognition of certain Jewish burial laws that stipulate who can be interred in a Jewish cemetery and in what fashion. It is well established that Jewish law forbids the burial of non-Jews with Jews in the same cemetery. Certainly, Balaban’s religious motivations have solid ground to stand upon. Yet, to acknowledge the validity of Balaban’s religious motivations obliges us to also consider the religious motivations of both the Steer family and Congregation Ahavath Achim. It has been reported that before she died, Juliet Steer requested she be “buried just like Jesus, according to Jewish customs” and was thus interred in the Jewish cemetery under the guidance of her brother Paul Steer and the full consent and support of Congregation Ahavath Achim. Some members of the Congregation have expressed outrage with Balaban’s request for Steer’s body to be exhumed and moved, citing Jewish burial law that stipulates that a body should never be exhumed from its resting place.
If Judge Martin chooses to allow this case to continue to trial, he will, in effect, assert the right of the government to monitor, correct, and dictate the proper interpretation of religious belief, doctrine, and moral and legal codes. Allowing this case to go to trial with the possibility of granting the injunction to exhume Steer’s body strips the Steer family and the members of Congregation Ahavath Achim, including Balaban, of their ability to define their faith on their own terms and places that power directly in the hands of a jury of their "peers" who may or may not have any familiarity with Jewish burial customs. Certainly, similar court cases have done just that, often to the benefit of the deceased person’s own or familial wishes. However, in this instance, the only real potential victim in this case is the Steer family, who, unaware of the internal conflict over the interfaith section, chose to honor her wish to be laid to rest according to her sincere, though unconventional, faith convictions.
Sunday, January 22, 2012
Sunday, December 4, 2011
The plaintiffs argue that, “Sussex County’s promotion of the Lord’s Prayer shows favoritism towards the majority religion and excludes those residents who don’t share that faith”. They also claim that the prayer pressures those attending the meetings to participate in the recitation of the prayer since the council members can see who is and who is not participating in the recitation of the prayer. The Americans United group also claims that the prayer is incredibly specific towards not only one religion, but one denomination of religion. The rendition of the Lord’s Prayer that is recited is an Episcopalian one. They believe that this particular rendition would be “unfamiliar and disagreeable” to other denomination of Christians such as, Catholics or Congregationalists. Therefore, they argue that this specific rendition of the prayer is not only offensive to non-Christians but also to other denominations of Christians.
I agree with the filing of this case and believe that the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer is an establishment of religion by the County Council. I understand that the saying of the Prayer is a Tradition that dates back 40 years, but that does not mean that it is not an establishment of religion. The continual recitation of a prayer, specifically the Lord’s Prayer, at county council meetings is an endorsement of religion by the state and therefore the court should rule that the prayer is no longer said at the beginning of council meetings.
In Marsh v Chambers the U.S. Supreme Court held that opening legislative sessions with a prayer by a Chaplain was constitutional, mainly because it was something that is a part of the unique history of the United States. However, this case is different from that of the Sussex County Council meetings because the prayer in Marsh v Chambers was read and recited by a Chaplin and not the members in the Nebraska Congress. Therefore, I feel that the Federal Court in the Sussex County Council case will not rule the same way that they did in Marsh v Chambers. The recitation of the Prayer is said by all attending the meeting and the forum in which the meetings are held adds pressure for those attending to recite the prayer. Also, since the Prayer is so specific towards one denomination of Christianity, I believe that the Federal Court would consider the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer an establishment of religion.
Currently, the Americans United group is asking the court to put a preliminary injunction blocking the recitation of the prayer at the meetings, at least until the court reaches a verdict. Do you believe that the federal court will side in favor of the Americans United group? Or do you feel that the court will follow the precedent set in Marsh v Chambers and argue that the prayer is a part of our nation’s unique history?
A small Christian congregation of just 48 members is awaiting a Supreme Court decision that would overturn a ruling outlawing the use of public schools for their Sunday services. Currently, the policy of the New York Board of Education regarding public school usage allows all community groups, including religious ones, to utilize the property; however, the only restriction is that worship services are not allowed to be held. This case involving the Bronx Household of Faith has lasted 17 years, when the church was first denied a permit to hold their worship services at a local public school by the New York Board of Education in 1994. In 1995 church pastor Robert Hall heard Alliance Defense Fund attorney Jordan Lorence talking about barriers to religious rights on the radio. Hall called up Lorence, informed them of their current situation. The ADF, which champions “the legal defense of religious freedom, the sanctity of life, marriage and the family,” took the case, and the case has been ruled on, appealed, reversed and then reversed again since 1995. In 2002, however, the Board of Education stopped enforcing the regulation, and the Household of Faith has been holding their Sunday services at P.S. 15 ever since.
Once again, we come to a crossroads: do we enforce the establishment clause at the extent of limiting free exercise; or do we champion the free exercise of religion while potentially violating the establishment clause? Due to the fact that the current policy allows “prayer, singing hymns, religious instruction, expression of religious devotion or the discussion of issues from a religious point of view,” but does not allow religious worship services to take place in public schools, it ultimately comes down to drawing a line and distinguishing between the former and the latter. The ADF maintains that this distinction between religious expression and worship is arbitrary. “You can have singing and prayer and Bible study, with all the elements of what people traditionally understand a worship service to be, but you can’t have a worship service?” Lorence asks. However, on the other side of the spectrum, the New York Civil Liberties Union believes that, “when a church sets up shop in a public school in a manner that conveys the appearance that the church is part of, or officially favored by, the school, it seems to run afoul of the separation of church and state.” Furthermore, many others in favor of the policy prohibiting worship services from public schools maintain that when a church holds a worship service in a school auditorium, that auditorium is transformed into a church for the duration of the worship.
Personally, I side with the NY Board of Education. I find the policy to be extremely fair and, quite frankly, more inclusive and sympathetic to religious groups than I would personally be if I was writing the policy. I know we have brought a similar issue like this up in class, and I think the distinction between religious expression and religious worship to be far from arbitrary. Churches, in particular, are known as “Houses of God.” Services are held in “Houses of God.” I truly believe that once you hold a worship service in a public school auditorium, you are metaphorically transforming the meeting space into a “House of God.” Also, since the children that attend these public schools are impressionable, they may not be able to tell the difference between the church and the school. In the article we read in class regarding these similar issues, one girl asked her father if “the church was part of [her] school.” They effectively run the risk of having the children see the two institutions as one in the same. Furthermore, if this policy is overturned and churches are allowed to hold services in public schools outside of school hours, it would not be neutral in practice. While technically, all religious groups are allowed to apply for permits, schools facilities are often only available on Sundays when other school groups are not using the facilities. This, in reality, only caters to Christian groups, since Muslim and Jewish groups hold their worship services on days that are not Sunday.
Ultimately the best way to maintain equality across all religions (which I believe to be the most important tenet of religious and political/legal interaction) is to restrict religious services from occurring in public schools. The propensity for perceived establishment is too high, and the “neutrality” of the policy, if it were to allow worship services, is terribly lacking. Worship needs to be kept in houses of worship, and out of public schools.
A Florida school administrator is crying foul after receiving a string of religiously and politically oriented emails sent to him by his immediate superior through official channels.
Patrick Capriola, the assistant principal of the Bannerman Learning Center, a public alternative school in Green Cove Springs, Fla., has filed suit against the Clay County School District and Bannerman’s principal, Linda Turner, claiming his constitutional rights were violated when Turner sent him and other school employees emails containing religious and political messages. In his lawsuit, which was filed in the US District Court in the Middle District of Florida on Nov. 18, Capriola claims Turner violated the Establishment Clause by using her official school email account to send a majority of the emails in question, which he argues were designed to “impose her religious views” on the school’s staff.
The emails mentioned in the lawsuit cover a variety of topics, ranging from an encouragement for all school staff to “to pray for rain in the name of Jesus for the State of Texas” to “an explicitly religious and proselytizing sermon-like viewpoint” on 9/11. Other emails are more political in nature and make fun of President Obama.
In filing his lawsuit, Carpriola seeks monetary damages for emotional pain and suffering. He has also requested that an injunction be granted that would bar Turner from sending any more emails to school employees containing “prayer and other religious proselytizing,” which would end what he calls Turner’s “endorsement and promotion of specific political [and religious] doctrine.”
Capriola’s lawsuit has two main claims: 1.) That his constitutional rights were violated when Turner sent him religiously and politically oriented emails; and 2.) That Turner violated the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution when she sent said emails using her official school email account.
The problem with Capriola’s first claim is that he has failed to highlight which of his constitutional rights were violated when Turner sent him the emails in question. Last time I checked, the Constitution did not include protections against being offended or annoyed by the actions of others. Unless he can highlight specific instances of Turner violating his rights, Capriola is unlikely to receive anything other than nominal damages (typically $1).
Capriola’s second claim, however, is much more interesting. Did Turner violate the Establishment Clause by sending religiously oriented emails to her subordinates using her official school email account? To answer this question, two other questions must be answered first: 1.) Are there any regulations or policies in the Clay County School District that dictate how official school email accounts can and cannot be used?; and 2.) In what capacity (official or unofficial) did Turner send the emails?
Analyzing the current policies (or lack thereof) regarding the use of government property and resources in Clay County will have a major impact on the outcome of this case. If there is a policy, either in written form or adopted as tradition by the school district, that prohibits the use of official email accounts for unofficial purposes, then Turner would clearly be in the wrong. However, even if such a policy exists, it would not necessarily prove that she violated the Establishment Clause, only that she violated local policy. In the end, it would all depend on what the “reasonable observer” would think. The courts tend to err on the side of a conservative definition of the reasonable observer, which means that if there is a regulatory policy regarding official email use, the court would most likely rule that the reasonable observer would view the content of the emails as “official,” and thus in violation of the Establishment Clause. However, if there is no such regulatory policy, the answer would be much more ambiguous.
The other, more important, element to analyze is in what context did Turner send the email, i.e. as the principal or as a private citizen. Had Turner sent the emails in her official capacity as the principal of the school, there would be an establishment issue because the requests for prayer would have been akin to an order given by Turner to her subordinates. However, it is evident by the content of the emails that requests for prayer were exactly that: requests. Everything Turner sent was sent in an unofficial capacity (i.e. she sent the emails as private citizen Turner, not Principal Turner). The fact that she used official channels for her unofficial communications only displays her foolishness, but does not constitute an establishment of religion.
Based on the evidence, I argue that Turner is guilty of nothing more than unwisely using her official email account. There is no evidence of any regulatory policies regarding how school employees can use their email accounts, nor is there any indication that Turner intended to coerce anyone into preforming any religious act using her position as their superior. The fact that the emails mentioned in the lawsuit came from a combination of both Turner’s official and personal email accounts is further proof that she intended them to be viewed in an unofficial capacity. It appears that she sent the emails to her subordinates using the email account linked to where she was located when she sent them (i.e. she used the official account when at school and the personal account when at home). In the future, any emails of this nature should be sent using only Turner’s personal account (although it would be wise for her to stop sending them altogether).
